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1. INTRODUCTION 
Differences between individuals or between groups of individuals are not only 
normal but also unavoidable phenomena in the biological world. But only within the 
human species do we find from the down of history, inequalities of a different nature - 
social inequalities, which has little to do with the biological differences [4]. Social 
conflicts of all times have hinged on economic inequality between social classes and this 
social difference singles out the human species from others. Thus there are different 
economic inequalities - income inequalities among individuals of a population, wealth 
inequalities between developed and developing countries, concentration of industry in 
the hands of a few individual companies etc. There are different economic programmes 
aimed at removing economic inequalities between social structures. Economic models 
of taxation, subsidies, income transfer and financial aids etc. are some of the means 
adopted to reduce the social inequalities i.e. to reduce the difference between the rich 
and the poor. 
Attempts to introduce quantitative measures of inequality of income or of 
wealth had started early in this century. In order to evaluate proposed measures it 
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in order to say that one distribution was 'more equal' than the other. The first attempt 
along this line was made by Lorenze [11] in introducing what has become as 'Lorenze 
curve'. 'Lorenze' technique was later discussed and modified by many authors [22, 23, 
24]. Later Dalton [2] took a different view point, leading to the principle of transfers. 
Dalton's work is of significant importance in mathematical economics; it paved the way 
of introducing a general measure of inequality, not necessarily of economic system and 
which led to the notion of entropy-like function much earlier to the works of Shannon 
[25] in information theory. There are various measures of income inequality introduced 
by various authors. We are however, interested in the entropic measure of income 
inequality for which Dalton is the pioneer. In the present paper our first objective is to 
investigate the process of introducing an entropic measure of income inequality and 
then to develop a maximum-entropy method for the optimal reduction of income 
inequality through the process of taxation. 
2. INCOME INEQUALITY AND ENTROPY 
The concept of inequality arises in various contexts and there is considerable 
interest in its measurement. Besides economics, in Political Science and Sociology also 
inequalities of voting strength resulting from legislative misapportionment, of tax 
structure are measures using various indices. The measurement of species diversity in 
ecology is essentially a problem of measuring equality [19]. Measurement of income 
inequality is discussed and surveyed by many authors [24, 26]. A rational approach to a 
general measure of inequality (not necessarily of income or wealth) is first due to 
Dalton [2]. According to Dalton [2] a function φ  is said to be a measure of inequality 
(better an index of inequality) if it satisfies the conditions [12]: 
(i)  For any two vectors  (,, . . . , ) = 12 n x xx x  and  (,, . . . , ) = 12 n yy y y  
() () φ φ ⇒≤ ≺ x yxy  
i.e. φ -should be Schur-convex. 
 
(ii)  ≺ x y  and  x  is not a permutation of  () () φ φ ⇒< yxy  
i.e. φ -should be strictly Schur-convex. 
 
The notation  ≺ x y  implies that the arguments of  x  are 'more equal' than 
those of . These conditions were first formulated by Dalton [2] although they are 
hinted at or are implicit in the works of Lorenze [11] and Pigou [20]. Again if 
y
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is also a measure of inequality satisfying Daltons' conditions. For measure of equality 
or species diversity in biology, it is desirable that a maximum be achieved when all the 
arguments are equal, so in (i) and (ii) Schur-concavity should replace Schur-convexity. 
A common measure of equality of unnormed distribution  (,, . . . , ) = ≥ 12 0 n x xx x  
(negatively taken measures of inequality of x ) considered in econometrics by Lorentz 
[11], Pigou [20], Dalton [2] and others are the functions of the form [17]: 
( , ,..., ) , ,..., φ
== =

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where  H  is some suitable entropy function. Different measures of inequality can be 
obtained for different forms of entropy functions  H  [12]. This is a brief account of the 
interrelations between the concept of entropy and the measure of inequality as 
developed by Dalton [2] and others and this is valid for all types of the system. 
Let us now turn to a specific economic system. It is the income distribution of 
individuals of a population or society. To determine a suitable measure of income 
inequality we follow Theil [27]. Let us consider a society consisting of   income 
earners with incomes
n
(, , . . . , =12 i ) c in . It is assumed that i c are non-negative and that at 
least some of them are positive, so that both the total personal income 
=
= ∑
1
n
i
i c C  and 
per capita personal income  /

 
 1
i c
=
= ∑
n
i
C n  are positive. The income share of  -th 
individual is his share of the total personal income: 
i
=
==
∑
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i
i n
i
i
c C
p
nC
c
. (2.1) 
His population share is his share of the total population, which is simply 1  
for each individual. Then following Theil [27] we define the measure of income 
inequality as the expected information of the message which transforms the population 
shares into the income shares: 
/n
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Now replacing C  by , the expression (2.2) can be reduced to the form,  / Cn
ln ln
=
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The second term of the r.h.s. of (2.3) is the form of Shanon entropy [25]   P. Jana, S.K., Mazumder, N.C. Das / Optimal Taxation Policy  98
ln ln
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The individual share  / = ii p cC  satisfying the conditions  , ( , ,..., ) ≥∀ = 01 2 i p in
S
 
and   defines a probability distribution and the Shanon-entropy   measures 
the diversity of the probability distribution{,
=
= ∑
1
1
n
i
i
p
, . . . , } 12 n p pp . Maximum is reached when 
/ == 1 n ==   12 p pp n  i.e. when all the income earners have the same income [9] 
/ ====   12 n c cc c n . (2.5) 
We can then write   as [9]  I
max ln ln
=
  =− = − −  
 
∑
1
n
ii
i

c c
IS S n
CC
 (2.6) 
From (2.6) we see that to reduce the income inequality we have to increase the 
value of the entropy . For the optimal reduction of the income inequality we have to 
maximize the entropy   subject to some constraints or policies determined by the 
Government. 
S
S
3. MAXIMUM-ENTROPY ALGORITHM UNDER 
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS 
In this section we shall briefly present the maximum-entropy algorithm under 
inequality constraints to be employed in the next section for the optimal reduction of 
income inequality through taxation. 
The maximum entropy method of estimation of an unknown probability 
distribution {,, . . . , } 12 n p pp  consists of the maximization of the entropy. 
ln
=
=−∑
1
n
i
i
Sp i p
,
 (3.1) 
subject to the given information or constraints usually expresses in the form of the 
inequalities. 
,, , . . .
=
=< > = ∑
1
12
n
ik k i
k
gp g i n . 
The expressed values < > i g  are assumed to be known exactly but in practical 
cases these averages are obtained either from physical measurement or from empirical 
experiments so that these experimental measures are usually subjected to errors. So, 
strict equalities in Eq. (3.2) are unrealistic and so we shall discuss maximum entropy 
algorithm for inequality constraints [6]. 
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subject to constraints 
() , ,, . . . ,
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First of all we convert constraints (3.4) into equations by adding slack-
variables, thus obtaining ( ) , , , ,..., += = 123 is i i gp p bi u . 
Similarly constraints (3.5) can be converted into equations by adding surplus 
variables which gives ( ) , , , ,..., −= = +++ 123 is i i gp p biu u u v . 
Thus the original problem is equivalent to: 
Maximize  () Sp subject to constraints: 
( ) , , , ,..., + == 123 is i i gp p b i u  (3.7) 
( ) , , , ,..., − == + + + 123 is i i gp p b iu u u v  (3.8) 
( ) , , , ,..., = =+ + + 123 ii gp b iv v v n  (3.9) 
where  (,, . . . , ) = 12 n p pp p . 
Now, either  > 0 si p  or = 0 si p . If we consider that each > 0 si p , then the 
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So, we see that if  , , , ,..., >∀ = 0 123 si p iv  then  , , , ,..., λ = ∀= 0 123 i iv , and so we can 
ignore the inequality constraints so far the optimality is concerned; in other words the 
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Now, if  = 0 si p  for some ' ' then the  -th inequality becomes equality and we shall 
assume the corresponding 
i i
λi to be non-zero. 
() Sp
n
c
, =
− 2 ≤ cf c
()
[(
c i f
i c
From the above discussion we can make an algorithm to find the point () p  at 
which   has its maximum value subject to the constraints (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). 
First of all we will consider the optimum of  () Sp ignoring the inequality 
constraints. If the point so obtained also satisfies the inequality constraints then that 
point will be the solutions of (3.3). If one or more inequality constraints are not 
satisfied then we will select one of the inequality constraints as an equality constraint 
ignoring others and repeat the process. If the point obtained in this step satisfies all the 
inequality constraints (except the one which became equality) then that point gives the 
solution of (3.3). Again if the solutions obtained in the second step do not satisfy one or 
more inequality constraints then we shall make two inequality constraints into 
equations and repeat the process. In this way we are to proceed until the optimum is 
obtained satisfying all the inequality constraints. 
4. OPTIMAL TAXATION: MAXIMUM ENTROPY ALGORITHM 
In this section we shall consider a method of reduction of the income (or 
wealth) inequality by taxation and study the role of the technique of maximum-entropy 
algorithm described in section 2 in determining the optimal taxation policy. 
As stated before let  , ,..., 12 c cc  be the income of the   individuals in a 
population and C  be the total income of the population. Let   be the 
taxation function for the certain taxation policy so that the income charged from a 
person is 
n
=
= ∑
1
n
i
i
)
() i fc
( ii c fc  whose income is  i c . We assume that no body is charged more tax than 
his income and there is no negative taxation or subsides. 
So we have  
() , , . . . , ≤≤ 01 1 2 i fc I n . (4.1a) 
One way of reducing income inequality is through taxation. However, in order 
that the income inequality is reduced through taxation we mast have   to be an 
increasing function of 
() i fc
i c  [9]. Let a person whose income is  i c  have the real income 
[( − ii ) ] c fc  after taxation. We also assume the fair taxation policy: 
() () () −≤ ≤−   111 2 2 nnn c cfc c c cfc  (4.1b) 
so that after taxation the richer does not become poorer. Then to minimize the income 
inequality is to maximize the taxation entropy [9]: 
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[( ) ] l n [(
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subject to constraints  
( ) ( , , ,..., ) ≤≤ ∀ = 01 1 2 3 i fc i n (4.4) 
and 
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the later implying the fixed income tax revenue. So, the problem is  
to maximize    i.e. to maximize   (4.6a)  ln( )
=
=−∑
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ii ii
i
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2
ln
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≤≤ 0 i qc i  (4.6b) 
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=
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1
n
i
i
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Now, to solve this we shall follow a technique of solving optimization problems 
under inequality constraints. 
Let us first ignore the inequality constraints (4.6b) and consider the 
Lagrangian 
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(i) Now  if  (, , . . . ,
−
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−
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cc f c
n
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So that after paying taxes, everybody has the same income. 
(ii)  If we see that, 
−
> m
CT
c
n
m c
 for some   then we will make the inequality 
constraints   into an equality i.e. 
m
≤ m q = mm q c  so that the Lagrangian in this 
step will be  
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So, in this case, 
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Now, if in this step  ,
−−
=≤
−1
m
i
CTc
c
n
≠ i i m q  then the taxation will be 
,
()
,
−−  −≠  = − 
 = 
1
0
m
i
ii
CTc
c im
cf c n
im
 
implying that every person except one will be left with income 
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while for the  -th person it is  m m c . 
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So, in this step our problem is equivalent to the maximization of   
subject to the constraints: 
ln
=
−∑
1
n
ii
i
qq
= mm qc  (4.15) 
= r qc r  (4.16) 
=
= − ∑
1
n
i
i
qC T  (4.17) 
This leads to,  ,
−− −
=≤
−2
mr
i
CTc c
qc
n
, ≠ i i m r  if (4.6b) holds, so that after 
paying taxes the will be left with income  ,, , , .
−− −−−
−− 12
mr
rm
CTc CTc c
cc
nn
. . m  then the 
taxation will be 
,,
()
,,
−− −  −≤  = − 
 = 
2
0
mr
ii
ii
CTc c
≠ c ci m
cf c n
ir m
r
 
but if (4.6b) does not hold for some   then we are to make three inequalities into 
equalities and we have to proceed in this way as long as necessary. 
i
 
 
5. OPTIMAL TAXATION: AN ALTERNATIVE MAXIMUM-
ENTROPY APPROACH 
We shall now follow an alternative approach to the solution of the optimal 
taxation problem. In the previous section the optimal problem has been reduced to the 
maximization of Shannon entropy (4.6a) subject to the constraints (4.6b) and (4.6c). In 
the present approach we shall decouple the inequality constraint (4.6b) from the 
equality constraint (4.6c) and modify the entropy (4.6a) to take account of the 
inequality constraint (4.6b), so that the new  q  estimated from the maximization of the 
new entropy subject to the equality constraint (4.6c) will automatically satisfies the 
constraints (4.6b). 
The modified form of entropy taking into account the inequality constraint 
(4.6b) is given by [9] 
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Let us consider the Lagrangian 
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where the Lagrangian parameter α  is determined by the inequality constraint: 
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then, 
( ) , ( , ,..., )
−  =− = = 

12 ii i i
CT
qcf c c i n
C
 (5.5) 
so that after paying taxes the person is left with income , ( , ,..., )
−
=

12 i
CT 
 c in
C
. 
Thus, we see that the incomes of each person are reduced by a fixed 
fraction
− CT
C
. Finally we note that the solution (5.5) satisfies both the constraints 
(4.6b) and (4.6c). 
The above solution is very simple in comparison with the earlier one. The 
earlier one is a generalization and in fact provides a mathematical foundation of the 
heuristic approach of Kapur [9]. The income inequality is one of the economic 
inequalities between the poor and the rich. If one of the objectives of taxation policy is 
to reduce the income inequality among the individuals of a population, the above two 
approaches based on maximum entropy principle, in spite of their limitations, provide 
two effective methods of solution of optimal taxation problems. 
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